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1. Introduction 
 
Scottish professional football clubs have been facing and continue to face challenging 
financial circumstances due to a combination of factors including: changes in the economic 
structure of European football; increased concentration of media income amongst bigger 
leagues in larger countries; the Scottish economic context; and poor corporate governance in 
some clubs. These circumstances have had substantive negative consequences with many 
clubs running up unsustainable levels of debt, reduced squad sizes, falling attendance levels, 
cuts in players’ wages and in extreme cases administration or liquidation.  Different clubs 
have adopted different solutions to these problems, some more radical than others. A number 
of clubs have sought new individual owners with deeper financial pockets to bail them out; 
some have restructured debt with their banks, which in practice has resulted in large debt 
write offs; while others have adopted new organisational forms such as Community Interest 
Companies to bring in new forms of finance and resources. Turning to the supporters was 
often seen as the last option for directors seeking to rescue a club. But the enthusiastic 
response of supporters in a number of clubs has led many involved in Scottish football now to 
view supporter involvement as a positive choice rather than considering supporters as 
‘lenders of last resort’. The response of supporters, even in cases of previous wrongdoing by 
directors, provides strong evidence of the value and importance of football clubs as 
community assets. 
The financial difficulties have also led to a broadly based political discourse on the 
ownership, governance, financing and accountability of football and football clubs in 
Scotland. Part of this discourse has involved questioning the roles and social value of football 
and football clubs. The Scottish Green Party’s attempts to include a “supporters’ right to buy” 
(their football clubs) provision in the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Bill (CEB) 
debated in the Scottish Parliament (Scottish Government, 2014), led the Scottish Government 
to establish an Expert Working Group on Supporter Involvement in Football Clubs 
(WGSIFC). In January 2015, the WGSIFC reported its findings (WGSIFC, 2015) and its 
Chair was invited by the Minister for Sport, Health Improvement and Mental Improvement to 
oversee implementation of its recommendations. Concomitant with this, the Scottish Green 
Party amendments to the CEB, were unanimously accepted by the Scottish Parliament, 
providing a framework to develop legislation to enhance supporters’ rights. This framework 
requires Ministers to consult widely before bringing further legislation, and a consultation 
was put in place to establish the level of support for a range of options in relation to supporter 
involvement in their football clubs, specifically: right to influence, right to govern, right to 
bid and right to buy (Scottish Government, 2015). Underpinning many of these initiatives is 
an assumption that greater supporter (and community) involvement in ownership, financing 
and governance will enhance the future resilience of clubs, and the value they provide to 
society. However, at present there is little evidence to support a case for increased supporter 
involvement in football clubs (Garcia & Welford, 2015).  
The focus of this paper is on evaluating the complex relationships amongst ownership, 
financing, accountability and governance structures on the performance, resilience and 
perceived value of Scottish professional football clubs
1
. A significant challenge for this 
research (and for related policy debates) is the difficultly in arriving at a clear understanding 
of what a football club is, of what constitutes a successful football club, and of measuring the 
                                                          
1
 We take the term ‘Scottish professional football clubs’ to mean clubs which are members of the Scottish 
Professional Football League (SPFL). 
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value or contribution made by a football club. Winning on the field is, of course, the most 
visible manifestation of a successful football club. However, there are numerous clubs which 
would regard themselves as successful without recently, or indeed ever, winning a trophy. 
For many, avoiding relegation or surviving until the end of the season could constitute 
success. Moreover, many contemporary professional football clubs are now complex 
businesses, intrinsically concerned with financial matters. Yet it is not uncommon for 
financially secure clubs to be criticised while the owners of clubs with extreme levels of 
indebtedness are praised for their commitment. More broadly, a club’s aspirations, values and 
history will play an important part in defining what success and survival means to that club, 
its supporters and other stakeholders.  
In this paper, we conceptualise football clubs as boundary objects; organisations that co-exist 
in different social worlds, serving different functions for those in these social worlds. 
Football clubs can be seen as spaces where different values/ideas can be translated and 
exchanged, and therefore the value of a football club is something that a club co-determines 
through engagement with its key stakeholders. The value of a club cannot only be measured 
in financial terms, but should also incorporate consideration of its social contribution to these 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the resilience of a football club is likely to be affected by a 
combination of different notions of value and the diversity of roles demanded by its network 
of stakeholders. This suggests that it is the alignment between a club’s ownership structure, 
governance mechanisms, accountability and methods of financing and the demands from the 
social worlds it inhabits that will be critical for the success, however defined, of a club.  
The paper begins by setting out the research context, before providing a review of literature 
focusing on football club ownership, financial, accountability and governance structures. We 
will use this literature review to construct a generic model of the attributes associated with a 
football club. These attributes represent the different aspects of a club from the perspective of 
key stakeholders and will be used to analyse the range of attribute configurations of Scottish 
football clubs.  
It is unlikely that a single structure will be suitable for all clubs, so understanding the 
different needs and roles a club fulfils for its stakeholders is essential in evaluating the 
effectiveness of different configurations of ownership, financial, accountability and 
governance structures. Drawing on our preliminary analysis of these configurations, we set 
out our tentative conclusions and plans for further research. 
 
2. Study setting and context 
The Scottish Professional Football League (SPFL) consists of a diverse group of 42 clubs, 
markedly different in terms of size and financial strength, and having different governance 
and ownership structures. Early football clubs in Scotland were legal entities which belonged 
to their members, and were run by and for their members. Their objective was to promote the 
playing of the game, not financial gain. Queen’s Park is an example of a Scottish club that 
has remained constituted as a club and has retained its amateur status throughout the 
professional era of Scottish football. Football in some other countries, including Germany 
and Sweden, continues to be organised through clubs. But as far back as the late 1800s, many 
British clubs adopted a private limited liability company form to protect the founders and 
officers of a club from personal liability in the event of the club incurring unpayable debts 
(Vamplew, 1988). The majority of Scottish professional football clubs continue to operate 
under this organizational form.  
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Until very recently, Scottish football was dominated both in football and financial terms by 
two Glasgow-based clubs, Celtic and Rangers
2
. Both of these clubs are structured as public 
limited companies and both have supporter bases that are international in reach. Their recent 
fortunes, however, have been strikingly different. While Celtic has continued to dominate 
Scottish football, winning the last five top division titles and reporting highly credible 
financial results, Rangers ran into financial difficulties with debt to Lloyds Banking Group of 
around £18m. Following a dispute with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs over the use of 
an Employee Benefits Trust and the sale of Sir David Murray’s controlling interest in the 
club for the token sum of £1 to Craig Whyte, the club went into administration in February 
2012, prior to being liquidated in October 2012. This was the most serious financial problem 
ever to hit Scottish football and was considered by many to have the potential to cause a 
financial crisis for Scottish football as a whole (Morrow, 2015). The concern was that, similar 
to a banking contagion, the problems faced by one individual club would threaten the 
stability of other clubs (Lago, Simmons & Szymanski, 2006). On the field, a newco (new 
company) Rangers was admitted to membership of the (then) Scottish Football League 
Division 3 (fourth tier) in season 2012/13, and finally gained promotion to the Scottish 
Premiership (top tier) in season 2015-16. 
While the majority of Scottish clubs seek to run themselves in a business-like manner, few if 
any clubs seek to maximise financial returns for their shareholders. While ostensibly their 
primary objective relates to achieving football success (defined relative to their status and 
size), Scottish professional football clubs also engage in a wide range of community 
activities, both football-related and other programmes in which football or the football club 
acts as a stimulus to engage community groups or individuals (Kolyperas, Morrow & Sparks, 
2015). Motivations for community engagements include normative concerns to contribute to 
a wider social good - giving something back to the community - and an instrumental 
approach, whereby social benefits are a by-product of revenue generation activities (Hamil & 
Morrow, 2011). Irrespective of their legal organisational form, most football clubs consider 
themselves, and are often considered by others, as social or community institutions. For 
example, the extensive media coverage which accompanies any club’s financial problems is 
not predicated on monetary implications, but rather on sporting and social costs of failure.  
Whether through necessity or aspiration for change, today’s supporters have a greater appetite 
to become more involved in the ownership, governance and financing of their clubs, and to 
hold the owners of their clubs to account (SFSA, 2016). In recent years there has been a 
movement among Scottish football clubs towards alternative organisational and governance 
structures, partly attributed to an absence of credible alternatives. In particular, there is an 
apparent absence of the ‘traditional owner’, an individual willing and able to take on the 
ownership and financing of a club. A number of clubs, not in chronic financial distress, have 
sought or are seeking to explore alternative organisational and governance structures which 
are more explicitly aligned with their objectives. Example include: Stenhousemuir FC which 
became a Community Interest Company (CIC) in 2006, the first football league company in 
the UK to adopt this structure; Stirling Albion FC which in 2010 became the first SPFL club 
to come under direct control of its fans; and Clyde FC which also became supporter-owned in 
2010. The latter two clubs both switched to supporter ownership in an attempt to secure their 
respective futures, arguably the result of having and then losing a wealthy benefactor. Among 
larger Scottish clubs, directors at Motherwell FC and Hibernian FC are also taking forward 
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 Since its inception in 1975/76, the SPFL (previously the Scottish Premier League and prior to that the Premier 
League) has been won by either Celtic or Rangers in 35 out of 40 seasons - the last occasion another club 
triumphed was Aberdeen in season 1984/85. 
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plans that incorporate substantive supporter inclusion. In Hibernian’s case, movements 
towards supporter involvement arise out of succession planning undertaken by the club’s 
longstanding owner, Sir Tom Farmer, and are akin to a supporter buy-in 
(http://www.hiberniansupporters.co.uk/about.html). 
Supporters have also been involved in financing arrangements that have rescued clubs from 
administration with consequences for future club ownership and governance structures. The 
most prominent development in terms of ownership has arisen out of the collapse into 
administration in June 2013 of one of Scotland’s largest clubs, Heart of Midlothian FC 
(Hearts), following a period of ownership by the Lithuanian businessman, Vladimir 
Romanov, and his related companies. Hearts was brought out of administration in June 2014, 
with the new owner, Ann Budge, intent on transferring ownership to the supporters group, 
Foundation of Hearts (FoH), a not-for-profit organisation established as a company limited 
by guarantee, within five years. FoH was set up in 2010 by a group of Edinburgh business 
people, with a number of supporters’ organisations joining it in 2013 to take forward the 
vision of supporter ownership. FoH is developing structures for governance and running of 
the business after it takes control, probably in 2019. Elsewhere, following the period of 
extraordinary ownership and governance instability at Rangers, leading up to and since its 
administration and liquidation in 2012 (Morrow, 2015), two separate collective supporter 
ownership vehicles – Rangers First (a Community Interest Company) and the Rangers 
Supporters Trust (a Community Benefit Society) - played significant roles in enabling the 
club to be taken-over by a consortium led by a South African based businessman, Dave King, 
at an Extraordinary General Meeting held in March 2015
3
.  
However, not everyone involved in Scottish football believes that greater supporter 
involvement will necessarily be beneficial for individual clubs or for football in general. The 
‘lunatics taking over the asylum’ argument still persists among some. The underlying 
assumption here is that supporters lack the necessary level of professional competence 
required to provide oversight and scrutiny of a club, and that they would encourage  high risk 
practices to achieve short term sporting success. Less pejoratively, owners of some Scottish 
clubs including St Johnstone and Alloa Athletic - individuals who have financed their clubs 
for long and sustained periods - have warned against the recent movement towards supporter 
ownership (Berry, 2014; Lamont, 2015). More generally, the WGSIFC took the position that 
there were different views within Scottish football (and beyond) as to the appropriateness or 
desirability of different ownership models and that a mixed ownership model was likely to be 
most appropriate for Scottish football given its history and financial condition
4
. Its efforts are 
focused on ‘encouraging broader involvement in football clubs, irrespective of the particular 
ownership structure adopted’ (WGSIFC, 2015). 
Scottish football clubs exhibit considerable diversity of organisational forms, financing 
models, governance structures and accountability practices. Table 1 provides descriptive 
details in respect of the clubs’ organisational form across the SPFL leagues in 2014/15. 
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 As of 10 February 2016, Rangers First has 13, 941 registered contributors, and owns over 2.8m shares, 
equivalent to 3.52% of the company, making it the largest supporter ownership group in British football 
(http://www.rangersfirst.org/; http://rangers.co.uk/club/investor-centre/share-information/). At the same date, the 
Rangers Supporters Trust had 6,250 members, who between them owned 1.7m shares, equivalent to 2.11% of 
the company’s issued share capital (http://www.therst.co.uk/). 
4
 A similar position was adopted by the Scottish Football Supporters’ Association in its Fans Manifesto for 
transforming Scottish football (SFSA, 2016).  
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Table 1. Overview: Organisational form, league status.  
 
Club Form Total - 
SPFL 
Premier 
-ship 
Champion
-ship 
League 
One 
League 
Two 
Public limited company (plc) 3 1 2 0 0 
Private limited company (ltd 
co.) – concentrated ownership 
19 7 3 5 4 
Private limited company (ltd 
co.)  – significant supporter 
ownership 
8 2 4 0 2 
Fan ownership transition* 3 1 1 1 0 
Community interest 
companies 
2 0 0 1 1 
Supporter controlled clubs 7 0 1 3 3 
Total 42 12 10 10 10 
 
*This category reflects clubs that have well advanced plans and proposals that are underway 
to move towards supporter ownership.  
 
Table 1 shows that 20 of the 42 clubs in Scotland have a significant level of supporter 
involvement either through shareholdings in private limited companies or through 
organisational structures that enable supporter ownership
5
. These include: limited liability 
companies with a substantial number of shares owned by supporter organisations; public and 
private limited companies in the process of transferring shares to supporters and supporters’ 
organisations with a view to a permanent change in organisational form; community interest 
companies; supporter-owned mutual organisations; and not-for-profit clubs.  
However, despite comprising almost half of Scottish clubs in total, these clubs account for 
only 25% of the fans attending Scottish football matches. For the most part, clubs with an 
element of supporter ownership are small and typically play in the lower tiers of Scottish 
football, although since 2016 this situation is changing as we have seen.  
We consider the Scottish professional football clubs to demonstrate high levels of resilience. 
Whilst in the recent past, 10 Scottish clubs have either gone into administration or 
liquidation, only two of these clubs – Clydebank FC and Gretna FC – are no longer part of 
the SPFL. The other eight clubs (Rangers, Hearts, Dunfermline, Motherwell, Dundee, 
Livingston, Morton and Airdrie) have partially recovered from their financial problems and 
remain in the SPFL. It has to be recognized that almost all clubs have experienced episodes 
of financial distress, but the majority have managed to respond to these threats and remain in 
existence.   
Our initial analysis of the resilience of SPFL clubs uncovered some interesting observations. 
We examined the history of clubs joining and leaving senior levels of Scottish football since 
its formation in 1890 (see Table 2). Since then, 82 different clubs have participated in senior 
football leagues, of which 62 still participate in football in some form or another. In total 40 
clubs have left the senior levels of Scottish football, of which 20 are now defunct, 3 have 
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 It is acknowledged that the great majority of shareholders in public companies and concentrated owners in 
private limited companies are themselves supporters of their club. The distinction here is where there is 
evidence of share ownership by a wide range of supporters, individually or through a collective ownership 
vehicle. 
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merged to form a new club that participates in senior football, 11 are participating in junior 
football leagues and 6 are playing in amateur leagues.  
 
Table 2. Clubs joining and leaving Scottish senior football leagues
6
  
 
Seasons New Clubs Joining Clubs Leaving 
Before 1900 20 7 
1900-1919/20 14 4 
1920/21-1939/40 25 22 
1940/41-1959/60 3 2 
1960/61-1979/80 2 1 
1980/81-1999/2000 3 1 
2000/01 to present 5 3 
   
The period 1920-40 incorporates the attempt to introduce a ‘Third Division’ in 1923 and as a 
result a significant number of new clubs were formed. Unfortunately, this league only lasted 
for three years before it collapsed due to clubs’ financial problems. However, not all of these 
clubs failed and 8 of these ‘new’ clubs continue to participate in the senior football leagues. 
Of the 42 current SPFL clubs, 81% are over 50 years old, while 57% have been actively 
competing in the league for over 100 years. Given all the economic, political and social 
events since 1890, this level of survivability indicates a remarkably high level of resilience. 
Moreover, since 2000, a period associated with major upheavals in football finance, only 
three teams have left the senior levels of Scottish football.  
   
3. Literature review 
The majority of Scottish clubs continue to have concentrated ownership corporate structures 
in which power rests with a dominant owner or family. Carlin & Mayer (2000) argue that 
concentrated ownership is beneficial as long-term, committed investors can provide both 
stability and certainty of purpose, the assumption being that a dominant owner will act as a 
utility maximiser, taking decisions which are consistent with their utility preferences 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). The likelihood that the pursuit of footballing success will contribute 
to an owner’s utility means that ceteris paribus, in the short term at least, there is a greater 
likelihood of goal congruence between supporters and the owner (Morrow, 2003). This 
                                                          
6 Source: Authors, Original Table drawn from various sources include Vamplew(1988), www.scottish-
football-historical-archive.co.uk/, spfl.co.uk/premiership/archive/ 
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assumes, of course, that supporters approximate to a homogeneous group and that the 
supporters’ collective desired outcome is football success (see Giulianotti, 2002; Hunt, Bristol 
& Bashaw, 1999). 
However, less benign interpretations of the ‘benefactor owner’ model and concentrated 
ownership have been observed (Beech, 2010). The   overlap of ownership and control can have 
negative implications for accountability and governance in terms of clubs’ wider stakeholders 
and, in particular, clubs’ supporters. For example, recent high profile collapses in Scottish 
football have been attributed in part to concentrated ownership. An individual (or small group 
of individuals) has exploited the commitment and loyalty of supporters through using a 
shared desire for success to legitimise irrational and unsustainable financial behaviour 
(Morrow, 2012). The stability that is assumed to arise from concentrated ownership is often 
an illusion, being dependent on the current owner’s ability and willingness to continue to fund 
the club (Cooper & Joyce, 2013; Morrow, 2012)
7. The stability comes from the owner’s 
actions and intentions and cannot be inferred from the club’s legal form or the proportion of 
shares owned or controlled. In the context of concentrated ownership in the benefactor 
model, any club’s stakeholders are exposed to, and at risk from, the behaviour and actions of 
that dominant owner.  
Markedly different football club ownership models, financial arrangements and governance 
structures are found in different countries and within countries. As a result, there is an 
emphasis in the research literature on structural solutions to problematic ownership 
structures, governance mechanisms, financial arrangements and accountability that may be 
transferable from other countries to the Scottish context (see, for example, Franck, 2010; 
Gammelsæter and Senaux, 2011; Garcia & Rodriguez, 2002; Hamil et al., 2010; Kelly, Lewis 
& Mortimer, 2012; Llopis-Goig, 2014; Morrow, 2003; Senaux, 2008). High profile members’ 
club structures such as that found at Barcelona (see, for example, Hamil, Walters & Watson, 
2010) have encouraged discussion within the UK on the applicability of forms of mutual or 
co-operative ownership in football clubs. Supporters Direct, the organisation set up in 2000 
by the then Labour Government to promote supporter involvement in football clubs has acted 
as an interface between academic studies, policy and practice, with much of the UK literature 
being directly related to or commissioned by the organisation (see, for example, Brown et al., 
2010; Football Governance Research Centre, 2001-06; Hamil et al., 1999, 2000, 2001; 
Michie, 1999; Supporters Direct, 2011a,b,c,d).  
Authors have identified a number of advantages and disadvantages of supporter ownership 
(see, for example, Adams & Armitage, 2004; Brown et al., 2010; Ward, Scanlon & Hines, 
2013). Advantages include: allowing clubs to emerge from a financial crisis, protection 
against exploitation by major shareholders, enhancing the experience of being a supporter, 
and connecting better with the local community which in turn creates business opportunities 
locally. Disadvantages of supporter ownership include: the financial cost of supporting a club 
is likely to increase, difficulty in attracting financial backing from wealthy individuals or 
corporations as this would not be rewarded with control, overly bureaucratic and slow 
decision-making, difficulties in attracting outside expertise on a voluntary basis, limitations 
                                                          
7 The Financial Action Task Force (2009) expressed its concern about the effects of the inherent financial 
fragility of football clubs being exaggerated by the financial crisis, thus making it harder to find sponsors, 
concluding that “there is a risk that clubs that are in debt will not ask many questions when a new investor 
appears”. The decision by Rangers former owner, Sir David Murray, to sell the club to Craig Whyte (and the 
subsequent sale to Charles Green) is perhaps a good illustration of this risk. 
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in identifying alternative revenue streams, and tension between those supporters wanting 
short-term success on the football pitch and those more concerned with long-term financial 
viability.  
In recent years, there has been widespread support – in academic, professional and political 
circles – for the so-called German model of hybrid ownership and governance. Traditionally, 
German football clubs were structured as multi-sports associations, controlled and managed 
by their members (Wilkesmann, Blutner & Müller, 2011). However, since the late 1990s, 
German clubs have been permitted to become joint stock companies as long as the original 
sporting association (verein) retains 50% plus one voting right in the new company. This 
ensures that members retain control over their club and prevents an individual or organisation 
from exercising control over more than one professional club (Dietl & Franck, 2007). This 
structure has now been adopted by more than half of the clubs in Germany’s top two divisions 
(Wilkesmann et al., 2011). Although considered by many as the ideal ownership and 
governance structure for football clubs (see, for example, House of Commons, 2011), it is not 
without its critics.  
Dietl & Franck (2007) suggest that this solution can lead to a governance vacuum. They 
argue that difficulties of organising a potentially heterogeneous group of supporters to make 
decisions and exert control over club managers and players are under-estimated. There is the 
risk of the elected club representatives seizing control over club assets and using their power 
to derive personal utility from their position in the club and its sporting success, while at the 
same time having no responsibility (beyond that of any member) for the financial 
performance and position of the club. These club representatives may lack the competences 
and expertise to provide useful oversight or scrutiny of the management of the club. This 
model, without effective governance and accountability reforms, could easily replicate the 
risks associated with the concentrated ownership-benefactor model. In fact, Dietl and Franck 
(2007) believe that conventional corporate governance mechanisms are more effective in 
limiting the discretionary freedom of managers. 
One of the key characteristics that distinguishes football clubs from conventional companies 
is the nature and importance of relationships between supporters and their clubs in terms of 
identity and belonging (Brown et al., 2006; Brown, Crabbe & Mellor, 2008; Morrow, 1999, 
2003), activism (Michie & Oughton, 2005; Vamplew et al., 1998), and partisanship 
(Simmons, 2006). It is easy to exaggerate supporter loyalty but it remains a vitally important 
asset to football clubs. Yet while decision-makers in clubs and the popular press understand 
the desire of supporters to engage with their club and are in a position to profit from 
supporters’ attachments to their clubs, the ways in which they could effectively harness this 
desire is under-developed. The very centrality of a club to many people’s identity, coupled 
with a fear of undermining the institution rather than a club’s owners, means that market-
based approaches such as exit (i.e. withdrawal of financial support) are rarely used as a means 
of controlling or disciplining behaviour in a football club. The conceptualisation of clubs as 
social institutions means that authentic accountability and effective governance is not easily 
achieved by supporters (Cooper & Johnston, 2012).  
Formal governance and accountability mechanisms are limited in their usefulness to many 
supporters, given their emphasis on compliance and on the notion of a rational economic 
decision-maker, with little or no consideration of the distinct nature of football club 
organisations and their stakeholders (Morrow, 2013, 2014). Building on the notion that 
football clubs are economic in basis but social in nature (Nash, 2000), Margalit (2008) seeks 
to explain why the interests of the community of fans merit protection through the recognition 
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of fans’ property interest in their club. Margalit discusses alternative ownership structures, 
but also sets out a new proposed governance structure for clubs – ‘the social property interest 
of fans’. This structure conceptualises supporters as social or moral owners of clubs and 
accords them special decision-making powers in respect of activities that bear a high risk to 
their community. More specifically, he suggests that supporters would be given an effective 
formal voice on matters most pertinent to their community while the financial owner would 
manage the day-to-day economic affairs of the club and extract financial compensation as 
appropriate.  The article stresses the importance of effective accountability measures between 
the supporters, supporter organisations and the club. 
A small number of papers focus on the financial accountability of clubs to their wider 
stakeholders. Given the financial precariousness of many football clubs, the general view is 
that quantity and quality of financial communication to supporters and the relevant 
communities is problematic (Cooper & Johnston, 2012; Morrow, 2005; 2013). A recent 
report (Morrow, 2014) into the implications of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations for 
football club financial reporting concluded that football club financial reporting was 
compliance driven, offering little meaningful disclosure on key performance indicators like 
salary costs and little evident benefit in terms of decision-making and wider accountability. 
One of the report’s recommendations was to call for research into the merits and demerits of 
bespoke financial reporting for football clubs, taking into account the distinct nature of 
football club organisations and their stakeholders. 
 
4. Researching football clubs as a configuration of attributes  
Football clubs have a multitude of different stakeholder groups, each existing in different 
social worlds (Strauss, 1978)
8
. These include not only shareholders and supporters, but may 
also include fan-based organisations, commercial partners, players, agents, taxation 
authorities, the local community, local authorities, other football clubs, the press and media, 
creditors, national and international football administrators, local businesses, public health 
organisations, third sector organisations and political parties. Each of these stakeholders will 
have specific desired outcomes with respect to their relationship with football or a specific 
football club that draw from their underlying membership of their chosen social world. 
Indeed, different desired outcomes will often exist within particular stakeholder groups. 
Football clubs can be seen as a setting for complex social interactions that require individuals 
from different social worlds or separate communities of practice to cooperate despite having 
different (and often conflicting) interests. The discourse associated with what constitutes 
success, objective setting and decision-making for football-related organisations suggests that 
football and football clubs may exhibit similar characteristics to boundary objects: entities 
that co-exist in different social worlds, serving different functions for those in these social 
worlds (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Conceptualising football clubs as boundary objects 
advocates that each club should be viewed as a configuration of interacting variables that 
shapes and is shaped by its relationships with different social worlds.  
Many football clubs, regardless of success on the pitch, are subject to substantive threats to 
their future existence and often appear to be teetering on the edge of failure. Yet despite these 
                                                          
8
 The term social world (Strauss, 1978) is used to describe a wide range of social groups that possess certain 
distinctive membership characteristics such as shared values, shared activities, shared resources and shared 
outcomes. It is a flexible term and similar to terms such as communities of practice. 
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existential threats and regular failure on and off the field of play, football clubs survive, often 
defying conventional business rationality, and demonstrating a resilience and adaptive 
capacity to respond to these external shocks (Szymanski, 2012; 2014) (see Table 2). Future 
resilience appears to be a desirable attribute of different configurations of ownership 
structures, governance mechanisms, accountability processes and models of financing. 
Therefore, understanding the relationship between organisational form, governance 
mechanisms, financing and accountability, and success as viewed by stakeholders from 
different social worlds, requires analysing the configuration of attributes of a club.  
Figure 1 represents our preliminary map of the attributes associated with a football club, 
drawn from our review of prior literature, and attempts to incorporate desired attributes from 
the different stakeholder groups.  This map provides the conceptual underpinnings of our 
analytical framework to explore the appropriateness for football clubs of different 
organisational forms, governance structures and practices, financial structures and practices, 
and accountability processes and practices. It also maps out the terrain of potential conflicts 
and contradictory outcomes associated with different stakeholder groups. In this paper, we 
use this attribute map to describe and evaluate different configurations of organisational, 
governance, financing and accountability structures, and club performance.  
 
Figure 1. Football club attributes map  
 
 
To provide an analysis of the attribute configuration of all 42 SPFL clubs, we gathered data 
on a number of attributes relating to the ownership, governance, accountability and financial 
position of the clubs in season 2014-15 and performance data/trend data from the previous 5 
years. Most of the information draws on secondary data in the public domain much of which 
is self-reported by the clubs and includes club websites, annual reports, Scottish FA and 
SPFL sources, news reports and football related databases and publications.  
This paper reports on the first iteration of our configuration analysis. It demonstrates the 
feasibility of the approach and has yielded encouraging preliminary results. A second 
iteration is planned in the next stage of the project, which will extend the timeframe of our 
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composition
stadium
Training facility
commercial
Liquidity crisis
Medium term 
viability
Levels of 
indebtedness
profitability
Player 
development
Manager / coach
Performance trajectory
trophies
League position
Resilience
Investment in 
players
Stadium 
capacity usage
Source of 
finance
age
administration
near misses
liquidation
Sale of players
Media 
Gate money
commercial
Owners funds
Asset sales
Supporters 
organisation
other
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attributes back to 1990 as well as increasing the scope of attributes measured. This will 
enable us to carry out a longitudinal analysis to complement the cross-sectional analysis 
reported in this paper.  
The ability to undertake a conventional statistical analysis is limited given the small number 
of Scottish clubs (notwithstanding that this represents a 100% sample) and the lack of 
homogeneity in the clubs, particularly in relation to club size. For example, if we look at the 
average home attendance for the fifteen year period to 2014/15, the average of all 42 clubs is 
5,152, with a standard deviation of 10,756, a minimum of 337 and a maximum of 53,825. By 
all measures, the distribution is far from normal, and it is indeed this diversity and lack of 
normality that we are seeking to understand.  
We are interested in analysing the configurations of club attributes and looking for possible 
patterns or relationships amongst these configurations. This is complicated by the absence in 
the literature of evidence of definitive causal relationships among attributes such as 
ownership, governance, financing methods, accountability, sporting performance and other 
measures of success. Given the complex causality identified in the literature, coupled with the 
diversity of Scottish football clubs and desired outcomes of club stakeholders, the most 
appropriate research methodology was considered to be fuzzy set analysis (FSA) (Ragin, 
2000, 2006, 2008).  FSA requires a logically and theoretically justifiable selection of 
attributes, which is a synthesis of different theories/past findings that have provided partial 
explanations into the objects of study. This type of analysis offers additional insights into 
complex problems for which there are a number of possible desired outcomes (Bergman, 
Lyytinen & Mark, 2007; Levina & Vaast, 2005).    
Using this approach, each attribute has some form of score that represents critical differences 
in that attribute. For example, when we looked at supporter involvement in club governance, 
we searched the records of a club to identify the overall composition of the board, including 
directors who were formally representing the interests of supporters. We then considered the 
critical differentiating levels of supporter representation in relation to supporters’ ability to 
control or influence the governance of the club. For this attribute, we identified three levels of 
supporter involvement in the formal governance mechanisms of the club: no supporters, 
meaning no formal representation on the board of directors; some supporters, associated 
with an ability to present the supporters’ view; and majority supporters, where the majority 
of board members were supporter representatives. The raw scores for this attribute combined 
with these critical thresholds allow us to classify clubs in relation to levels of supporter 
involvement in club governance (see section 5.2). 
We undertook a similar exercise for all attributes, gathering raw data and determining 
specific thresholds for each attribute to provide a score for each club. Details of the attributes 
and scores used in this paper are provided in Table 3. In some cases, we were not able to 
access sufficient evidence for all clubs on certain attributes, in other cases we were not able 
to determine robust, justifiable thresholds and in others still the attribute score did not 
differentiate the clubs. For example, all clubs provided detailed, often highly critical, 
accounts of their sporting performance and, regardless of the size of the club, were subject to 
extensive media coverage at a local level. The attributes not incorporated in this paper are 
listed in Table 4 but will be subject to further investigation to improve the quality of our 
analysis.  
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Table 3. Attributes included in analysis and score thresholds 
 
 Thresholds 
Governance     
Compliance football Compliant Administration Liquidation 
Financial Compliant Administration Liquidation 
Supporter involvement None Some on board Majority 
Organisational form Plc/Private limited 
company   (ltd 
co.)* 
In transition Alternative# 
Supporters     
Average attendance Small Medium Large 
Resilience     
Age of club < 20 years old Between 20 & 95 
years old 
> 95 years old 
Liquidation No history Been liquidated 
Administration No history At least one period of administration 
Accountability     
Financial disclosure No public 
disclosure 
Selected 
disclosure 
Full disclosure 
Values, aspirations     
Investment in players (MV of 
current squad) 
Market value < 
£250K 
Between £250K 
& £1m  
Between 
£1m & £3m 
 £3m 
Competitive context Scottish Premier Scottish 
Championship 
League 1 League 2 
Club infrastructure     
Manager / coach Below average 
managerial change 
Average level of 
managerial 
change 
Higher than average 
managerial change 
Squad composition Low levels of 
Scottish qualified 
players 
Average levels of 
Scottish qualified 
players 
High levels of Scottish 
qualified players 
Stadium capacity usage Low level of 
capacity usage 
Average level of 
capacity usage 
High level of capacity 
usage 
Player development Low levels of 
players from own 
youth teams 
Average levels of 
players from own 
youth team 
High levels of players 
from own youth team 
Financial Risk     
Liquidity crisis Secure levels Mixed risk levels Risky levels 
Levels of indebtedness Secure levels Mixed risk levels Risky levels 
Medium term viability Secure levels Mixed risk levels Risky levels 
Profitability Secure levels Mixed risk levels Risky levels 
Community engagement     
Community size (population) < 25,000 25 -100,000 > 100,000 
Sporting performance     
League position See performance trajectory 
Performance trajectory Down/mixed Stable Upwards 
 
*plc means public limited company; private limited company (henceforth ‘ltd co.’) means a private 
company limited by shares. 
# Alternative includes community interest companies, mutual organisations and not-for-profit clubs. 
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Table 4 – Excluded attributes  
 
 Reason for non-inclusion 
Governance  
Compliance legal No reliable data 
Compliance ethical No reliable data 
Risk Insufficient data 
Supporters  
Number of supporters organisations No thresholds established /  non-discriminatory 
Loyalty Insufficient data 
Resilience  
Near misses No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Accountability  
Sporting performance No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Funders Insufficient data 
Supporter No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Media scrutiny No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Social impacts No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Values, aspirations  
Future goals Insufficient data 
History / culture No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Club infrastructure  
Training facility No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Commercial No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Community engagement  
Local connectedness Non-discriminatory 
Activities Non-discriminatory 
Forum No thresholds / non-discriminatory 
Sporting performance  
Trophies No thresholds  
Source of finance  
Owners’ funds Insufficient data for all clubs 
Asset sales Insufficient data for all clubs 
Supporters’ organisation Insufficient data for all clubs 
Other Insufficient data for all clubs 
Media broadcast rights Insufficient data for all clubs 
Gate money Insufficient data for all clubs 
Commercial Insufficient data for all clubs 
Sale of players Insufficient data for all clubs 
External environment  
Social acceptability of football Non-discriminatory in a cross-sectional study 
Media coverage Non-discriminatory in a cross-sectional study 
Economic Non-discriminatory in a cross-sectional study 
Football institutions & restructuring Non-discriminatory in a cross-sectional study 
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The existing dataset provides a number of interesting insights into the diversity of Scottish 
football clubs. In one small footballing nation, there is evidence of the emergence of different 
configurations shaped by different factors: past, present and future risk perceptions; club 
histories and values; and crisis events. 
Section 5 reports on a configuration analysis of the relationships between the attribute 
configurations, listed in Table 3, and ownership models, supporter governance, financial risk, 
sporting performance trajectory and financial disclosure. These configuration analyses were 
selected for this paper as they represented possible causal relationships identified in the prior 
literature and could inform the current policy discourse in relation to Scottish football.  We 
were looking for evidence to support or deny prior assumptions relating to how football clubs 
are owned, financed or governed, and to different approaches to accountability adopted.  
 
 
5. Configuration analysis and discussion 
In this section, we report our findings on the relationships between the attribute 
configurations sorted by: 
1. Organisational form 
2. Supporter involvement in governance 
3. Financial risk 
4. Sporting performance trajectory  
5. Financial disclosure  
 
Sub-sections 5.1 to 5.5 provide summaries of the ‘typical’ configuration of attributes for 
clubs in respect of each of these five categories.  
 
The notion of a ‘typical’ attribute is determined by whether 70% or more of clubs share that 
attribute classification, and is indicated by capital letters in bold. To provide additional 
information, we have also included scores where over 50% of clubs share an attribute 
classification in common (lower case and not bold). If there is no dominant classification 
(NDC) in respect of an attribute, we have noted that in the tables. No dominant classification 
suggests that there is no observable relationship between the selected attributes and therefore 
no typical class for that attribute in the configuration. In certain situations, where the 
incidence of one attribute class is less than 10% and there is no typical classification, we 
make the classification ‘NOT’ in bold. If the incidence of the classification of that attribute is 
less than 20% we make the classification ‘not’. The use of ‘NOT/not’ suggests that for this 
attribute, the distribution of clubs is not distributed across all attribute classes, but has a more 
limited range. 
 
5.1 Analysis of attribute configurations by organisational form  
 
Table 5 is a summary of the ‘typical’ configuration of attributes for clubs adopting particular 
organisational forms. Due to low numbers in different categories of ownership, in this section 
we use three categories of organisational form: 1) plc and private limited companies, 2) clubs 
in transition, and 3) alternative structures (Community interest companies, Supporter-owned 
clubs, Mutual organisations and Not-for-profit clubs). 
 16 
 
 
 
Table 5. Organisational form configurations 
 
 PLC/LTD CO. TRANSITION ALTERNATIVE 
Supporter involvement in 
governance 
NO SOME MAJORITY 
Financial risk risky RISKY risky 
Financial disclosure NONE FULL NONE 
Financial and football 
sanctions 
NO ADMINISTRATION NONE 
Managerial change  
NDC not average BELOW 
AVERAGE 
Size NDC not small SMALL 
Performance trajectory NDC not up STABLE 
Youth % NDC HIGH NDC 
Scottish qualified not low not low HIGH 
Stadium capacity usage LOW MEDIUM LOW 
Age of club >95 >95 not <20 
Ambition (MV of current 
squad) 
not £1m-£3m >£3m NDC 
Local community 
population 
NDC 25K-100k 25K-100k 
 
Table 5 demonstrates significant differences and similarities among the ‘typical’ PLC/LTD 
CO., club in TRANSITION and ALTERNATIVE club structures. What is interesting, in 
relation to the set of Plc/Ltd cos. is the number of attributes for which there is no dominant 
classification, suggesting that it is difficult to generalise about clubs which have adopted a 
corporate structure. One explanation for this is the longevity of this organisational form. As 
discussed in the Introduction, many of these clubs have been structured as companies since 
the late 1800s / early 1900s and hence unsurprisingly over such a long time period there is 
evidence of variation among club attributes. The configuration of clubs in the alternative set 
is much more consistent, suggesting that the decision to adopt a form other than corporate is 
preferred by clubs which are small, stable, governed by their supporters and with locally 
based players. Note that as regards financial risk, these clubs are similar to clubs in the 
Plc/Ltd co. classification, indicating a lack of evidence for the ‘lunatics taking over the 
asylum’ argument. 
 
Clubs currently in the transitional set – those clubs that have well advanced plans and 
proposals to move towards supporter owned clubs – appear to be significantly different from 
the other two sets, in particular their history of financial failure and current financially 
precarious state. There is, of course, an element of causality here as supporter ownership has 
often been the option of last resort for clubs in financial difficulty (WGSIFC, 2015). However, 
clubs that have experienced financial difficulties, including periods of administration, are likely to 
have more explicit understanding of the necessity for financial common sense.    
 
5.2 Analysis of attribute configurations by supporter involvement in club governance  
 
Table 6 is a summary of the ‘typical’ configuration of attributes for clubs with differing 
levels of supporter representation on their boards (see explanation above for details on table 
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notation). We identify three classifications for this attribute. The first classification is NONE 
when there is no supporter representative on the board of directors. The second classification 
is SOME, which can range from one supporter representative to a number less than 50% of 
the total board members. This classification describes situations in which supporter 
representatives have a role in formal club governance but cannot by themselves determine 
board decisions. The third classification for this attribute is MAJORITY and describes 
situations in which supporter representatives make up more than 50% of the directors on the 
board and hence should have a controlling influence in all board decisions. 
 
Table 6. Governance and supporters on the board configurations 
 
 
 NONE SOME MAJORITY 
Organisational form PLC/LTD CO. plc/ltd co. ALTERNATIVE 
Financial risk NDC risky RISKY 
Financial disclosure NONE not selective NONE 
Financial and football 
sanctions 
NO no NO 
Managerial change  
below average average BELOW 
AVERAGE 
Size medium NDC SMALL 
Performance trajectory MIXED/DOWN mixed/down STABLE 
Youth % NOT LOW not high LOW 
Scottish qualified high NDC HIGH 
Stadium capacity usage low low LOW 
Age of club >95 >95 20-95 
Ambition (MV of current 
squad) 
NDC NDC <250K 
Local community 
population 
not >100k NDC <25K 
 
 
There seems to be a relationship between the level of supporter representation on the board 
and the organisational form. Most Plc/Ltd cos. have no supporter representation whatsoever 
while, in contrast, clubs with alternative organisational ownership structures have majority 
supporter representation. What is noteworthy is that the typical performance trajectory in the 
set of clubs with majority supporter representation appears better (stable) than the other two 
sets (mixed/down). That said, there does not appear to be a level of supporter representation 
that is associated with an upward performance trajectory. Stability of performance can also be 
observed in terms of managerial change, with the change in clubs with majority supporter 
representation being below average. However, this set of clubs also appears to be associated 
with low levels of youth development and low levels of investment in player squads, relative 
to clubs with some or no supporter representation on the board. Their financial position is 
also typically worse than the other two sets. Whilst over 50% of clubs with majority 
supporter representation are in small communities, other clubs in similarly small communities 
have adopted differing levels of supporter involvement. 
  
5.3 Analysis of attribute configurations by current financial risk  
 
Table 7 is a summary of the ‘typical’ configuration of attributes for clubs with differing 
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levels of financial riskiness derived from an analysis of their most up to date financial 
statements. Due to their size (measured in turnover), most clubs submitted abbreviated 
accounts, which only contained disclosure on Net assets, Creditors less than one year, 
Creditors more than one year, Deferred income and Retained profits. Hence, a proxy for 
turnover was calculated as follows:  
 
Turnover = average home attendances * home matches played * average ticket price for 
respective league.  
 
The following ratios were then calculated and used to determine a club’s riskiness.  
 
Net Assets/Turnover Proxy (threshold > 1); 
Net Assets (Threshold > 0); 
Total Creditors/[Net Assets + Total Creditors] (threshold > 1.0); 
Creditors less than one year/Net Assets (threshold > 1.0). 
 
We identify three possible classifications for this attribute. The first classification is SECURE 
when our analysis of the financial statements indicates no evidence of financial risk in respect 
of all ratios calculated. The second classification is MIXED for which some, but not all, of 
the financial ratios breach the risk thresholds. The third classification for this attribute is 
RISKY and describes situations in which all of the financial ratios calculated breach the 
assigned risk thresholds.  
 
Table 7.  Current financial risk configurations 
 
 
 SECURE MIXED RISKY 
Organisational form PLC/LTD CO. plc/ltd co. plc/ltd co. 
Supporter involvement in 
governance 
NOT 
MAJORITY 
NONE NDC 
Financial disclosure none none none 
Financial and football 
sanctions 
NO no NO 
Managerial change NDC below average NDC 
Size small MEDIUM not large 
Performance trajectory STABLE NOT UP NDC 
Youth % medium HIGH NDC 
Scottish qualified NDC high not low 
Stadium capacity usage low LOW low 
Age of club >95 >95 >95 
Ambition (MV of current 
squad) 
NDC NDC not £1m-£3m 
Local community 
population 
NDC 25k-100k not >100k 
 
 
It is difficult to observe any significant patterns in the typical attribute values for clubs in the 
financially secure set, financially mixed set or financially risky set. This suggests that the 
relationship between financial performance and other attributes is complex, without any clear 
patterns or configurations. Table 7 suggests that financial security is associated with small 
 19 
 
stable clubs, primarily companies with some supporter representation and a medium level of 
home-grown football talent.  
 
It is interesting to observe that the most secure and the most risky clubs have not been subject 
to financial failure. This suggests a more complex relationship between financial failure and 
other club attributes rather than one driven merely by current financial status. This 
observation is supported by the number of attributes with NDC in respect of risky clubs. It 
indicates that riskiness cannot be easily defined or understood by the attributes. So it is 
difficult to generalise about which clubs are at risk of financial and/or footballing sanction.  
 
5.4 Analysis of attribute configurations by recent league position trajectory.  
 
Table 8 is a summary of the ‘typical’ configuration of attributes for clubs with differing 
patterns of league positions over the previous 5 years. League positions for each club were 
gathered and the following values calculated: 
 
 the range between the highest and lowest league position; 
 the difference between the league position at the beginning of the period and at the 
end of the period; 
 whether the club had been promoted in that period; and 
 whether the club had been relegated in that period.  
 
Four classifications were initially determined for this attribute. The first classification was 
STABLE, where the range of the league positions was less than 6 and the club had neither 
been relegated nor promoted. The next classification was UPWARDS where the range of 
league positions was greater than 6, the difference between starting position and end position 
was greater than 6, and/or the club had been promoted and not relegated in that period. The 
next classification was DOWNWARDS where the range of league positions was greater than 
6, the difference between starting position and end position was more negative than -6, and/or 
the club had been relegated and not promoted in that period. Clubs that did not meet the 
criteria of any of the previous three classifications were classified as MIXED. Given the 
relatively small number of cases, we decided to group DOWNWARD and MIXED 
performance trajectories together as they were both seen to represent a negative performance 
trajectory relative to STABLE and UPWARD trajectories. 
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Table 8.  Football performance trajectory configurations 
 
 DOWN/MIXED STABLE UPWARDS 
Organisational form PLC/LTD CO. plc/ltd co. PLC/LTD CO. 
Supporter on board not majority none none 
Financial risk risky NDC risky 
Financial disclosure none none NDC 
Financial and football 
sanctions 
no NO NO 
Managerial change NDC below average below average 
Size medium small NDC 
Youth % NDC NDC low 
Scottish qualified NOT LOW high medium 
Stadium capacity usage low LOW medium 
Age of club >95 >95 NDC 
Ambition (MV of current 
squad) 
NDC <£250K >£3m 
Local community 
population 
25k-100k <25k <25k 
 
 
There are very few differences between clubs in the different sets as regards their 
performance trajectories. Overall, there appears to be a lack of ‘typical’ classifications in the 
different sets. For example, the Plc/Ltd co. is the dominant organisational form in down, 
mixed, stable and upward performance trajectories. In Table 8 there are only 7 out of 42 
classifications which meet the 70% commonality threshold. This suggests the possibility of 
more complex, perhaps non-linear, relationships among performance and different 
organisational, governance, financing and accountability attributes. Furthermore, there does 
not appear to be a configuration of club attributes that is associated with medium term 
sporting success in league based competition. However, it has to be noted that Celtic FC has 
dominated Scottish football in the past 5 years, resulting in that club being classified as 
stable, despite winning the last five top division titles. It should also be noted that in the same 
period, the parent company of Rangers Football Club, the club with the most similar 
configuration to Celtic, was liquidated and the newco Rangers football club relegated to 
League Two (the fourth and lowest tier in the SPFL).  
 
5.5 Analysis of attribute configurations by financial disclosure levels  
 
Table 9 is a summary of the ‘typical’ configuration of attributes for clubs with differing 
patterns of financial disclosure. Three classifications for public financial disclosure practices 
were determined. The first classification was FULL, where the club made public on its 
webpages its full set of annual accounts. The next classification was SELECTIVE, where the 
club did not make public its annual accounts, but did make disclosure in relation to its 
financial performance or position on its website or press releases, including reference to 
selective figures from their accounts. The final classification was NONE, where a club 
neither made its accounts public nor made any public comment in respect of its financial 
performance or position. It should be noted that classification as NONE does not mean that 
the clubs are in any way in breach of any financial disclosure or registration requirements. 
Rather, it refers to public access to this information.    
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Table 9. Financial disclosure configurations 
 
 FULL SELECTIVE NONE 
Organisational form plc/ltd co. PLC/LTD CO. PLC/LTD CO. 
Supporter involvement in 
governance 
some NONE NDC 
Financial risk risky risky risky 
Financial and football 
sanctions 
admin NO NO 
Managerial change NDC below average NDV 
Size LARGE MEDIUM SMALL 
Performance trajectory down/mixed stable not up 
Youth % high medium low 
Scottish qualified medium medium HIGH 
Stadium capacity usage high medium LOW 
Age of club > 95 > 95 NDC 
Ambition (MV of current 
squad) 
> £3m > £3m >£250k 
Local community 
population 
> 100k 25k-100k <25k 
 
Given previous claims of the precarious nature of Scottish football finances and incidence of 
past footballing financial distress, it might be anticipated that many clubs would have a high 
level of financial disclosure, drawing insights from legitimacy and stakeholder theories 
(Cooper & Johnston, 2012; Morrow, 2005, 2013). While there did not appear to be any 
significant patterns in relation to organisational form, there does appear to be some 
relationship between the related attributes: size of the club, its age, market value of squad, 
stadium capacity usage and location in large urban communities. This suggests that larger, 
more ambitious clubs are more likely to make public their accounting or financial disclosures. 
We only observed 8 clubs that disclosed their financial accounts, while 24 clubs provided no 
public disclosure of their financial performance or position. Again, it should be emphasised 
that there was no evidence of non-compliance with regulatory requirements and the financial 
accounts of all clubs were available for shareholders (and to others via Companies House) 
and club members. Moreover, all SPFL clubs are required to submit Annual Financial 
Statements to the Scottish FA as part of its Club Licensing Regulations (Scottish FA, 2015, 
Criterion 8.1). However, we were interested in the general disclosure of financial accounts to 
supporters and the public. Interestingly, while Criterion 8.2 of the Scottish FA Club 
Licensing Regulations (Scottish FA, 2015) requires clubs also to provide summary financial 
information and warns clubs that “this information will be made freely available via the 
Scottish FA Website”, no evidence of such disclosure is found on the Scottish FA website.  
The values in Table 9 suggest no apparent relationship between public financial disclosure 
and supporter ownership/board representation. We might have anticipated that clubs with 
higher levels of supporter representation would have emphasised supporter accountability in 
relation to the clubs’ financial performance. However, it is possible that there is less need for 
public financial disclosure as direct supporter accountability and communication channels 
may be in existence in such clubs. Our analysis does suggest that a past financial crisis leads 
to improved voluntary disclosure of financial information, but not in every case. Large city 
based clubs that were public limited companies or in transition to supporter-owned clubs, 
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with a recent negative performance trajectory, or had experienced administration, were more 
likely to disclose their financial reports. One interpretation of this evidence is that it suggests 
a desire to make supporters aware of the financial situation of the club, perhaps to enroll their 
support for future changes in how the club is owned, financed or governed. Indeed, in the 
case of transition clubs, it may be a much more instrumental response in the sense of being 
necessary to elicit financial support to ensure the survival of the club. Put another way, the 
resilience of the club is perceived to be dependent on supporter involvement. 
 
6.  Conclusions, contribution and future research  
In recent decades there has been a financial transformation of professional football in Europe, 
notably a greater concentration of income among big clubs and big leagues (see, for example, 
UEFA 2015). This, together with a greater incidence of clubs in financial distress throughout 
the professional game in Scotland, have focused attention on the desirability of developing 
new insights into clubs’ organisational, governance, financing and accountability structures 
and practices in different contexts. 
While football clubs are ostensibly simple organisations, existing to facilitate participation in 
organised football, in practice they are organisations with complex and often contested multi-
faceted objectives and purposes: sporting, social and financial. Scottish football clubs are 
akin to boundary objects; organisations that exist in different social worlds, which rely on 
complex social interactions among separate communities with different and often conflicting 
interests. In Scotland, the vast majority of football clubs are clubs in name only, having long 
since adopted corporate organisational structures, but with markedly different ownership 
models and governance structures. Yet at the same time, most of them are companies in name 
only, with little or no apparent emphasis on corporate performance objectives such as profit 
maximisation. What does matter, however, is the resilience of these clubs, meaning not only 
financial sustainability but also wider notions of value and purpose. Future resilience appears 
to be a desirable attribute of different configurations of ownership structures, governance 
mechanisms, accountability processes and models of financing,  
Our initial descriptive analysis has identified a number of attributes that could inform 
decisions relating to the organisational form, governance structures, accountability processes 
and models of financing of football clubs, and hence the future resilience of clubs. We argue 
that each football club should be viewed as a boundary object and thus as a configuration of 
interacting variables that shapes and is shaped by its relationships with different social 
worlds. Understanding the relationship between different variables requires an analysis of the 
configuration of attributes of clubs.  
In the Scottish context, whilst each club may have a unique configuration, our evidence 
suggests that certain configurations are more prevalent and persistent than others. There were 
examples of relatively small clubs in lower leagues with limited sporting ambition and a 
strong, local community identity that had supporter and community involvement in 
ownership, financing and governance. There were larger clubs with long histories, displaying 
greater sporting ambition that adopted a more risky financial strategy in order to be 
competitive, but we also observed clubs with more secure financial positions. Some of the 
clubs that sought to be nationally competitive were more reliant on limited liability forms 
with lower levels of formal supporter involvement, but others were actively seeking to 
transition to mutual organisations and/or greater levels of supporter representation.  
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There were examples of mid-ranking clubs with long histories and a strong community 
identity in larger towns, but with more modest sporting ambitions, that were exploring 
different types of ownership / governance to ensure a sustainable future. But at the same time 
there were just as many clubs in this set that were persisting with the concentrated owner 
model.  
There is the possibility of a novelty factor – ‘living the dream’ – influencing newer clubs, 
which are less inhibited by history and have enhanced sporting ambitions. Perhaps less 
constrained by financial considerations and with less traditional approaches to community 
relationships, they may adopt more innovative approaches to financing, ownership, 
governance and accountability. There is also the possibility of emergent clubs, smaller clubs 
with concentrated ownership structures, a long history and local community identity, 
receiving significant investment from owners with an enhanced ambition for sporting 
success. These clubs have limited supporter involvement but maintain community 
engagement in line with the club’s history and culture. 
The clubs with very high expectations and demands for footballing success, desire for 
international competitiveness, strong community (well beyond the local), and international 
branding, did have many similar attributes in their configurations. But there were also 
extreme differences over the time period of this study, e.g. financial and football sanctions, 
performance trajectory. The challenge for these clubs (Celtic and Rangers) is to balance local 
and international demands, specifically the need to invest to be competitive at a European 
level, but within the limited resources available from the national competitions. 
Clubs have to make decisions on the relative importance of developing their own players 
through youth academies, training infrastructure, and buying/selling players in the local and 
international transfer markets.  The proximity to resource rich leagues in England and Europe 
has a major impact on these decisions, notably a collapse in the ability of even the largest 
Scottish clubs to compete for players in the transfer market. However, the ability to sell 
players to clubs beyond Scotland still remains an attractive possibility. 
The cross-sectional nature of the study means that we did not explore the impact of the player 
transfer market, other national leagues or infrastructure investments. However, we did 
identify some differences worthy of further investigation in relation to observed differences 
in the levels of Scottish qualified players and players developed through clubs’ own youth 
training programmes. It would appear that smaller clubs with alternative ownership structures 
and high levels of supporter involvement in club governance were less likely to recruit 
players from their own youth programmes. But they were also more likely to recruit Scottish 
qualified players than other clubs.  
The use of configuration analysis has enabled us to begin to understand a football club as a 
configuration of attributes. This first iteration demonstrates the feasibility of the approach. It 
has yielded encouraging preliminary results which will help to improve our understanding of 
important matters such as the most appropriate organisational form and governance structure 
for particular types of club, and the drivers of financial distress. Our analysis suggests that 
there are common configurations of clubs in terms of the identified attributes:   
 
 Financial security is associated with small stable clubs, structured as companies with 
some supporter representation and a medium level of home-grown football talent. 
 The configuration of attributes of clubs across the ‘alternative’ organisational 
ownership structure set is fairly consistent. It suggests that the decision to adopt a 
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structure other than that of a company limited by shares is associated with small stable 
clubs governed by supporters, with more Scottish qualified players. These clubs, 
however, are just as financially risky as clubs in the Plc / Ltd co. set.  
 Clubs with an organisational structure which is currently in transition appear to be 
significantly different from other clubs, being characterised in general by a history of 
financial failure and a current precarious financial situation. This is unsurprising given 
that supporter ownership has commonly been an option of last resort for failing 
Scottish football clubs.     
 There is evidence of a relationship between the level of supporter representation on 
the board and the organisational form. The majority of clubs structured as public or 
private limited companies have no supporter representation whatsoever, whereas 
clubs using alternative organisational ownership structures have majority supporter 
representation. With the other configurations examined, ownership structure does not 
appear to be a central distinguishing feature. 
 A history of financial crisis normally leads to improved voluntary disclosure of 
financial information. But there is no apparent relationship between public financial 
disclosure and supporter ownership or supporter board representation.  
 There is no evidence of a typical configuration of attributes associated with medium 
term sporting success.  
 There is no evidence to support the ‘lunatics taking over the asylum’ argument, with 
some evidence of greater stability in clubs with a majority of supporters on the board. 
 
Our preliminary results support the view that there is no single best model for a football club. 
What is required is an understanding of the attributes that exist among different clubs 
operating at different levels within the professional game in Scotland. However, our results 
do suggest that some of the prior assumptions on the relationship among sporting 
performance, ownership, governance, financing and accountability attributes are not always 
supported by the evidence. Certain configurations appear to be associated with certain 
contexts, yet the outcomes can vary significantly.  
This paper has made a contribution to the theoretical conceptualisation of football clubs. It 
has also helped our understanding of the inter-relationships among what different 
stakeholders consider to be the critical attributes of a club. The evidence presented has the 
potential to inform policy-making in this area, in particular the lack of evidence that links 
financial risk-taking and short-term behaviour to supporter owned and supporter controlled 
clubs. However, this study explored associations among attributes and does not provide 
evidence on causality. To do this, we will need to gather more longitudinal data over a longer 
time frame and further develop the theoretical bases for determining critical thresholds for all 
relevant attributes. This will facilitate greater use of sensitivity analysis and allow a 
longitudinal analysis to complement the cross-sectional analysis reported in this paper. 
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